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TNC Motives for Signing International Framework Agreements: 
A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stakeholder Pressure 
Abstract 
Over the past decade, discussion has flourished among practitioners and academics 
regarding workers’ rights in developing countries. The lack of enforcement of 
national labour laws and the limited protection of workers’ rights in developing 
countries have led workers’ rights representatives to attempt to establish transnational 
industrial relations systems to complement existing national systems. In practice, 
these attempts have mainly been operationalised in unilateral codes of conduct; 
recently, however, negotiated international framework agreements (IFAs) have been 
proposed as an alternative. Despite their growing importance, few studies have 
empirically studied IFAs. This paper starts to fill this gap by studying why 
corporations adopt IFAs, based on a qualitative study of the process leading to the 
signing of a recent IFA. The study’s findings complement existing research into why 
corporations adopt IFAs, codes of conduct, and CSR policies by demonstrating that 
corporate motives can be linked to a desire to retain a trusting relationship with the 
labour union movement. In addition, the findings indicate that the discrete campaign 
model of stakeholder pressure dominant in previous research should be complemented 
by a continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure. The paper concludes by 
discussing differences between these conceptual models of stakeholder pressure and 
avenues for future research. 
KEY WORDS: code of conduct, corporate social responsibility, international 
framework agreement, labour practice, non-governmental organisation, stakeholder, 
transnational corporation, union 
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Introduction 
Over the past decade, discussion has flourished among practitioners and academics 
regarding workers’  rights in developing countries. As many have noted, national 
legislative frameworks in countries such as China and Vietnam are well developed 
(e.g., Warner, 1996; Chan, 1998; Ding and Warner, 1999; Cooney et al., 2002). 
However, there are large gaps between labour law and corporate practice in most 
developing countries, especially in countries, such as China, with recently amended 
labour laws (e.g., Zhu and Fahey, 1999; Lau, 2001; Liew, 2001; Cooney et al., 2002; 
Chen, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). In practice, this means that when 
transnational corporations (TNCs) offshore operations, mainly to Asian countries, 
they are involving themselves in national industrial relations systems characterised by 
only limited enforcement of workers’  rights. This lack of enforcement of national 
labour laws and limited protection of workers’  rights has led workers’  rights 
representatives (both labour unions and non-governmental organisations) to attempt to 
establish transnational industrial relations systems to complement existing national 
systems (Esbenshade, 2001; Riisgaard, 2005; Anner et al., 2006; Kuruvilla and 
Verma, 2006).  
Attempts to establish transnational industrial relations systems have mainly taken two 
routes. First, as early as the 1970s (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000), but more forcefully 
in the 1990s and 2000s, workers’  rights representatives have demanded linkages 
between workers’  rights and trade – initially in GATT and then in WTO (commonly 
known as the ‘social clause’  debate) (e.g., O’ Brian et al., 2000; Van Roozendaal, 
2002; Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005; Bartley, 2007). However, the limited success of 
these demands made workers’  rights representatives direct most of their attention to 
individual corporations rather than international organisations, this second approach 
being operationalised by promoting so-called codes of conduct and international 
framework agreements (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Fairbrother 
and Hammer, 2005). While codes of conduct are the transnational industrial relations 
system preferred by most NGOs and TNCs (Schlegelmilch and Houston, 1989; Sethi, 
1999; Gallin, 2000; Guillén et al., 2002; Nijhof et al., 2003; Compa, 2004; Connor, 
2004), most labour unions and a few TNCs prefer an international framework 
agreement (IFA) system (Gallin, 2000; Connor, 2004; Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 
2005).  
Codes of conduct and IFAs serve the same purpose, namely, to improve workers’  
rights, but represent different ways of governing workers’  rights transnationally. 
Hence, the code of conduct versus IFA debate is fundamentally about alternative 
transnational workers’  rights governance systems and about what CSR means in 
practice in the ongoing process of globalization. In this debate, codes of conduct 
represent a unilateral and corporate-controlled workers’  rights governance system, of 
which labour union representatives are sceptical, seeing it as a system of ‘given’  
rights. Labour unions basically argue that codes of conduct are convenient public 
relations tools for TNCs, enabling them to prevent and ‘crowd out’  union involvement 
in workers’  rights issues (e.g., Justice, 2003; Frundt, 2004; Roman, 2004; Lipschutz, 
2004). Instead of codes of conduct, union representatives prefer a workers’  rights 
governance system built on negotiated firm–union IFAs that recognise the role of 
labour unions in promoting transnational workers’  rights (Egels-Zandén, 2008). In 
addition to the symbolically important issue of the labour union movement’ s role in 
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transnational workers’  rights governance, there are also differences in the underlying 
logic of the code of conduct and IFA governance systems. First, codes of conduct 
envision governance driven mainly by consumer pressure (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 
2001), while IFAs put more emphasis on the traditional union strategy of leveraging 
control of the labour supply. Second, codes of conduct envision governance driven by 
pre-established codified principles of workers’  rights, while IFAs place a greater 
extent emphasis on the bargaining logic that underpins national industrial relations 
systems (cf. Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007). Hence, the code of conduct versus 
IFA debate involves both symbolic and substantial factors related to emerging 
transnational governance systems for workers’  rights. 
Workers’  rights are integral to CSR and business ethics more generally, for example, 
being included in the UN Global Compact principles. Hence, the choice of a code of 
conduct or IFA transnational governance system has implications not only for 
workers’  rights but also for the future development of related CSR issues, such as the 
link between human rights and workers’  rights, the role of NGOs in business ethics, 
and the link between national and transnational governance systems. Despite this and 
the extensive research into codes of conduct, there are only a handful of studies 
examining IFAs. This almost exclusive research focus on codes of conduct exists even 
though the number of signed IFAs has been consistently and rapidly increasing (cf. 
Hammer, 2005), making IFAs an important complement to codes of conduct. The 
sparse existing research into IFAs has also almost exclusively been conducted from 
union and NGO perspectives, providing limited insight into the central research 
question of what motivates corporations to sign IFAs. This paper addresses this gap, 
by explicitly focusing on corporate motives for adopting IFAs. This is done based on 
a qualitative study of the process leading to a recently signed IFA in a European TNC.  
Previous research into international framework agreements 
International framework agreements and codes of conduct serve the same purpose, 
namely, to improve workers’  rights in corporations’  own and their suppliers’  factories 
(cf. Gallin, 2000; Compa, 2004; Connor, 2004). The main difference between codes 
of conduct and IFAs is that while codes are unilaterally adopted by corporations, IFAs 
are negotiated and signed by both the corporation and representatives of the labour 
union movement. Hammer (2005) and Sobczak (2007) demonstrate in their reviews of 
existing IFAs that there are various forms of IFAs, making it difficult to pinpoint the 
exact characteristics of IFAs. However, in terms of content, IFAs build on ILO 
Conventions and UN Conventions, cover both companies’  own and their suppliers’  
operations, and involve trade unions in negotiation (Hammer, 2005; IMF, 2006; 
ITGLWF, 2007; Sobczak, 2007). Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007) also demonstrate 
that IFAs include more processual aspects of worker representation than do codes of 
conduct. The first IFA was signed as early as 1989 between Danone and the 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and 
Allied Workers’  Associations (IUF) (Miller, 2004; Hammer, 2005). Despite this early 
start, almost all existing IFAs have been signed in the twenty-first century.   
In recent years, many researchers have noted the existence of IFAs, their potential 
impact on workers’  rights, and the high priority that signing these agreements has for 
global union federations (e.g., Gallin, 2000; Muller-Camen et al., 2001; Wills, 2001; 
Connor, 2004; Spooner, 2004; Chang and Wong, 2005; Royle, 2005; Andersen, 2006; 
Turnbull, 2006; Waddington, 2006; Doellgast and Greer, 2007). Connor (2004, p. 64), 
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for example, notes that global union federations (GUFs) have “sought to persuade a 
number of companies to sign international framework agreements”, but that “only a 
relatively small number of companies have been willing to participate in such 
programmes”. While a great many papers note the existence of IFAs and argue that 
more research is needed into them, few have actually provided any insight into IFAs. 
Recently, a handful of empirical studies have started to fill this gap, Jane Wills’  
(2002) study of the Accor–IUF agreement being the first rigorous research into IFAs. 
Wills (2002) focused on the implementation of the Accor–IUF agreement and noted 
that IFAs created a space for local bargaining. However, Wills (2002) did not examine 
the processes leading to the signing of IFAs and provided limited insight into the 
motives for adopting IFAs. Miller (2004) partly addresses these gaps by focusing 
explicitly on the union strategies adopted by GUFs to pressure TNCs to sign IFAs, 
and noted that despite ample attempts to promote the signing of IFAs, GUFs have 
achieved only limited success in this regard. Riisgaard’ s (2005) study expands on both 
Wills’  (2002) and Miller’ s (2004) studies, analysing both the processes leading to the 
signing of IFAs and the implementation of IFAs, based on a qualitative study of the 
Chiquita–COLSIBA agreement. Like Miller (2004), Riisgaard (2005) found that 
public campaigns and consumer pressure are key strategies employed by unions and 
NGOs to make TNCs sign IFAs.  
Complementing these studies are the more review-based studies conducted by Carley 
(2005), Fairbrother and Hammer (2005), Hammer (2005), Anner et al. (2006), and 
Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007). Hammer (2005) and Sobczak (2007) are helpful 
in listing and categorising existing IFAs and in discussing their legal dimensions, 
while Anner et al. (2006) compare IFAs and alternative transnational union strategies 
and Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007) compare IFAs and codes of conduct. 
However, due to their broad foci, none of these studies deals in detail with the 
processes leading up to the signing of IFAs. Hence, the limited existing research into 
IFAs has only just started to explore, the motives for signing IFAs; when this has been 
done, it has been done from a union perspective, with Miller (2004) focusing on 
GUFs and Riisgaard (2005) focusing on both global and local unions. Consequently, 
little, if any, research has systematically analysed the motives for signing IFAs from a 
corporate perspective. At best, previous research has led to indirect guesses as to why 
the corporate counterpart agreed to sign an IFA, as derived from a description of the 
process from the union perspective. The purpose of the present research is to start 
filling this gap in previous research. 
Given the high priority of IFAs in the labour union movement and the heated debate 
regarding codes of conduct versus IFAs, it is surprising that so little research has 
examined IFAs. This gap has likely resulted because IFAs are seen as situated 
between two research strains, namely, business ethics and industrial relations. In the 
business ethics literature, union issues and union perspectives have tended to be 
neglected (Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001; Riisgaard, 2005; Provis, 2006). For 
example, Leahy (2001, pp. 34-35) notes that “it seems odd that one could turn to these 
texts on managerial ethics for information on labour/management and be left with the 
impression that unions did not exist, that managers did not have to negotiate with 
them”. Hence, the business ethics literature has likely ignored IFAs, since these are 
closely linked to union strategies and perspectives. The industrial relations literature, 
on the other hand, has framed IFAs as part of the corporate social responsibility 
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(CSR) trend rather than as part of traditional studies of union strategies (e.g., Miller, 
2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Shanahan and Khagram, 2006; Waddington, 2006). In turn, 
the CSR trend has received only limited attention in the industrial relations literature 
(Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007), with the result that industrial relations scholars 
pay only limited attention to IFAs.  
Plausible motives for adopting international framework agreements 
While there is limited research into why corporations adopt IFAs, there is extensive 
research into why corporations adopt codes of conduct, research that might provide 
insight into corporate motives for adopting IFAs. Code of conduct research can be 
summarised into four main identified motives.  
First, the most common explanation of why corporations adopt of codes of conduct is 
that such codes represent a way to restore and/or improve corporate legitimacy/ 
trust/reputation/image/brand (e.g., Sethi and Sama, 1998; Diller, 1999; van Tulder and 
Kolk, 2001; O’ Rourke, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Graafland, 2004; Wright and 
Rwabizambuga, 2006; Bartley, 2007; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2008). For 
example, van Tulder and Kolk (2001, p. 268) claim that in “ the 1990s, a wave of 
voluntary company codes appeared, triggered by attention for developments which 
posed great legitimacy problems to firms” . Hence, the adoption of a code of conduct 
is envisioned as leading to greater acceptance of the corporation in the society in 
which it operates, in turn yielding financial benefits for the corporation (cf. Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Long and Driscoll, 2008). Legitimacy is 
also the main reason for the corporate adoption of IFAs presented in the only previous 
studies of this issue (Miller, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005). Riisgaard (2005) demonstrated 
that the Chiquita–COLSIBA IFA stemmed from public NGO-driven campaigns in 
Chiquita’ s major consumer markets, campaigns affecting consumers, investors, and 
other stakeholders, and concluded that Chiquita adopted the IFA to improve its 
perceived legitimacy. The legitimacy threat pushing companies to adopt codes (or 
IFAs) is mainly exerted by NGO consumer campaigns (van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; 
Roberts, 2003; Graafland, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2008), 
though such pressure also comes from other stakeholders, such as financial investors 
(e.g., Schueth, 2003; Guay et al., 2004; Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Sobczak, 2007). 
Second, besides protecting, restoring, and/or improving legitimacy, corporate 
adoption of codes of conduct has also been presented as a way to avoid governmental 
interference. For example, Esbenshade (2001) argues that adopting codes of conduct 
provides a way for corporations both to prevent the enforcement of existing labour 
laws and forestall future legal reforms. Similar claims are readily found in previous 
research (e.g., Diller, 1999; Bondy et al., 2004; Royle, 2005; Arya and Salk, 2006), 
and, as Bartley (2005, p. 212) points out, a common argument is that “ one unfortunate 
effect of the rise of private regulation will be to displace or ‘crowd out’  public 
regulation and legal accountability” .   
Third, some authors also point to the potential corporate competitive advantages 
arising from adopting codes of conduct (e.g., Waddock et al., 2002). These 
advantages could be achieved in several different ways – quite aside from improved 
legitimacy, as already noted above. For example, Christmann and Taylor (2002) argue 
that voluntary CSR initiatives can provide learning that allows firms to modify and 
improve operating routines and policies, while Bondy et al. (2004) identify the 
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following potential advantages: i) product differentiations in the market place, ii) 
quality signals, iii) reduced insurance premiums, and iv) maintenance of standards 
along the supply chain. Regardless of the particular reasons, the overall argument is 
the same: adopting codes of conduct provides a way to achieve competitive 
advantages vis-à-vis one’ s competitors.  
Finally, several authors also argue that corporations adopt codes of conduct for ethical 
reasons. Hence, in this research, corporation decision-making is not framed as solely 
motivated by shareholder maximisation ideals, but as also motivated by other values. 
For example, Weaver (1993, p. 48) argues that at “ least some managers advocate code 
implementation for the sake of ethical action as an end in itself”  (italics in original) 
(cf. Bondy et al., 2004). This argument is linked to the more general argument that 
corporations are driven by multiple objectives, for example, as claimed in some 
research into descriptive stakeholder theory (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995).   
These four explanations of why corporations adopt codes of conduct can be linked to 
the larger body of research into why corporations embrace particular social and/or 
environmental practices. For example, the often-cited article by Bansal and Roth 
(2000) outlines a model of why companies “ go green”  and identifies four main 
explanations: i) stakeholder pressure (compare with legitimacy), ii), legislation 
(compare with avoiding governmental interference), iii) economic opportunity 
(compare with competitive advantage), and iv) ethical motives (compare with ethical 
reasons). Hence, there are great similarities between the four main explanations 
offered by previous research into why corporations adopt codes of conduct and by 
research into why corporations embrace social and/or environmental practices more 
generally. 
Method 
To explore why corporations adopt international framework agreements, I make use 
of material from an explorative study of a European TNC – hereafter referred to as 
“ EuroCorp” .1 The focus on EuroCorp was chosen because it is commonly ranked as 
one of the best firms globally in terms of CSR. In addition, it is one of the few TNCs 
that have signed an IFA. Given that the motives for corporate adoption of IFAs are 
poorly understood, the reliance on a qualitative study is in line with previously 
proposed methods (e.g., Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Lee, 1999; Maguire et al., 
2004). 
The study of why EuroCorp adopted an IFA is part of a larger study of EuroCorp’ s 
CSR practices in both Europe and Asia. Data for this larger study were gathered from 
interviews, written documentation, and observations. Between 2005 and 2008, over 
100 actors linked to EuroCorp’ s CSR practices were interviewed. This included 
EuroCorp top and middle management, members of the EuroCorp CSR department, 
EuroCorp workers, and local and international stakeholders. In addition, between 
2006 and 2007, observations were made at EuroCorp, mainly examining the practices 
of EuroCorp’ s CSR department. Finally, EuroCorp has allowed nearly unfettered 
access to all written documentation regarding their operations, including official and 
unofficial documents, contracts between involved actors, and all written 
communication between involved actors. Similarly, the EuroCorp union allowed 
nearly unfettered access to all its written documentation.  
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The material used for this paper mainly comprise interviews and documents. All key 
corporate and union actors involved in the process of adopting EuroCorp’ s IFA were 
interviewed (several of them on multiple occasions). This included corporate 
representatives and enterprise, national, and global union representatives. The 
interviews lasted on average one hour, were semi-structured, and were taped and 
transcribed. The written documentation (early draft versions of the IFA and the code 
of conduct, internal documents, reports, newspaper articles, and web pages) were used 
both to complement and validate the information provided in interviews. 
The collected data were used to chronologically represent EuroCorp’ s process of 
adopting IFAs, outlining key decision points and conflicts. There were few 
inconsistencies between the information obtained from the verbal and written sources. 
When inconsistencies were identified, either between different interviews or between 
written and verbal sources, they were discussed with the relevant involved actors and, 
if still present after this, included in the case description to transparently present 
divergences of opinions. An earlier version of the empirical section of this paper was 
then sent to the interviewed representatives, so they could validate the description of 
the definition process. Finally, the interviewees’  suggested changes were incorporated 
into the final description of the definition process.  
Based on this description of the process and on the collected data, various 
explanations of why EuroCorp adopted the IFA were examined. First, the reasons 
stated in the interviews were identified. Second, the explanations outlined in previous 
research into why corporations adopt codes of conduct were examined as plausible 
explanations of EuroCorp’ s behaviour. Finally, based on these analyses, probable 
explanations were identified and additional data were collected to support or refute 
these explanations. Despite these efforts, it is difficult – perhaps even impossible – to 
identify exactly why corporations make certain decisions. For example, the involved 
actors themselves might not necessarily know why they acted in certain ways and 
multiple motives may be entwined, making it difficult to identify the key motive. 
Hence, the conclusions presented here should be interpreted with some caution in 
terms of why EuroCorp adopted an IFA. The conclusions are mainly valuable when 
compared with the results of previous research into IFAs, codes of conduct, and the 
adoption of social and/or environmental practices, so as to expand our understanding 
of why corporations adopt IFAs. 
The road to EuroCorp’s international framework agreement 
Background: The international code of conduct versus IFA debate 
The focus on CSR in relation to developing countries intensified in late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when activist campaigning uncovered the working conditions in TNCs’  
and their suppliers’  operations (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; 
Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Bartley, 2007). Issues such as child labour and sweatshops 
were readily debated in the mass media, putting extensive pressure on TNCs to justify 
their operations. In the early 1990s, TNCs such as Levi’ s, GAP, Nike, and Reebok 
responded to this criticism and embraced an extended responsibility for workers’  
rights (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004). This extended responsibility was mainly 
operationalised through corporate adoption of codes of conduct (e.g., Schlegelmilch 
and Houston, 1989; Sethi, 1999; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Guillén et al., 2002; 
Nijhof et al., 2003).  
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Parallel to the mainly NGO-driven emergence of codes of conduct as a way to 
operationalise corporate responsibility, labour unions started to develop an alternative 
– IFAs – emphasising signed rather than unilateral agreements. In this way, two 
competing (or complementary) ways of operationalising corporate responsibility 
emerged, NGOs and companies mainly promoting codes of conduct and labour unions 
mainly promoting IFAs (Gallin, 2000; Connor, 2004; Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 
2005; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006).  
The IFA idea enters into EuroCorp via the union movement 
In this turbulent mid-1990s setting, the idea of a EuroCorp IFA emerged. The IFA 
process was instigated by the global union federation (GUF) responsible for 
EuroCorp. At that time, the GUF had recently made a policy decision to prioritise and 
promote IFAs, and as a step in implementing this strategy, GUF representatives raised 
the issue of an IFA at one of EuroCorp’ s corporate–union World Works Council 
meetings.  
During the World Works Council meeting, the GUF representatives and enterprise-
level union representatives also had the opportunity to discuss how to move forward 
with a EuroCorp IFA. As one of the EuroCorp enterprise-level union representatives 
noted, the timing of this GUF initiative was favourable, since the enterprise-level 
union was looking for a way to handle issues of workers’  rights globally in EuroCorp; 
It all started in mid 1990s. The reason was that at that time EuroCorp was 
being questioned regarding how EuroCorp handled issues mainly related 
to child labour, working environment, salaries, etc., in different 
countries. We [i.e., the enterprise-level union] wanted to have a general 
EuroCorp view of how to treat employees regardless of where production 
was located.2 
When discussing what he meant by “ being questioned” , it became clear that the 
questioning mainly came from members of the EuroCorp enterprise-level union and 
the international union movement. At that time, few, if any, other stakeholders were 
discussing these issues with EuroCorp. The EuroCorp manager then responsible for 
these issues confirmed this, claiming that at that time there was no pressure from 
customers, investors, media, or stakeholders other than the unions to adopt either a 
code of conduct or an IFA. 
After some internal union discussion, representatives of the EuroCorp enterprise-level 
union approached the relevant corporate manager with the IFA idea. As this manager 
recalled, 
In conjunction with a EuroCorp labour union World Works Council 
meeting, the question about an agreement arose. It was probably the 
global union federation that pushed for this issue and then the question 
came to me. The EuroCorp enterprise-union representatives posed the 
question: Shouldn’ t EuroCorp have such an agreement that more 
formally regulates how we, the union, and you, EuroCorp management, 
work together? I responded: It is possible. Leave the issue with me and I 
will consider it. 
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Internal corporate resistance to codifying responsibilities 
Shortly after this approach by the EuroCorp enterprise union, the relevant EuroCorp 
managers discussed the idea of an IFA. Although the managers saw few direct 
problems with having such an agreement, there was general scepticism toward 
codifying workers’  rights issues. As one manager explained, 
We discussed it internally, and my opinion was that there was nothing 
really stopping us from formalising what we were doing anyway. 
There is always, however, a risk when you start formalising, that 
things will become too rigid. I mean, it was not that the [EuroCorp 
enterprise-level] union was trying to fix something that was not 
working, and it was not that we wanted to fix something that was not 
working. Rather, I guess both parties felt that things were working 
very well. At that time, we had rules and agreements at the European 
level that regulated European corporate–union relations. If you really 
followed all these rules to the letter, it would become extremely 
bureaucratic and we felt that we had a more natural and productive 
way of working. So there was some fear or scepticism regarding what 
such an agreement would yield. But for some reason I felt that maybe 
we should have an agreement, because they [the EuroCorp enterprise-
level union] would not let this idea go. 
Some key top managers also objected that codifying practices and responsibilities 
would make it very rigid. As one of the involved EuroCorp managers recalled, 
We talked to top management, who were sceptical about the code of 
conduct idea. They basically reasoned as we did, but as top 
management they could decide that we should not have such an 
agreement. It would become too rigid. 
This led the process to somewhat of a halt. At the same time, the EuroCorp manager 
mainly responsible for union relations perceived that the enterprise-level union would 
simply not accept a negative answer regarding the development of an IFA. This 
perception seemed correct, with union representatives continuing to inquire regularly 
into whether it would be possible to develop an IFA.  
Moving forward with a code of conduct 
In the late 1990s, the process regained momentum with a working group being created 
to develop a code of conduct. Hence, the emphasis shifted at this time from a 
negotiated IFA to a unilateral code of conduct. The external actors pressuring for the 
formalisation of EuroCorp’ s CSR engagement into a policy document had also 
broadened from mainly the union movement, so as now to include investors and 
media. As one EuroCorp manager recalled, 
In the late 1990s, there were more and more discussions about ethics, 
and I felt that this was no problem for us. We had handled these issues 
well already. Then I started receiving questions. ‘Do you have this in 
writing’ , and I’ d answer, ‘No, it is not necessary – we have worked 
this way for years’ . The answer I got back, for example, from investors 
analysing companies, was then, ‘How do we know that this [i.e., what 
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you say] is correct when it is not documented? You say so, but we 
need something tangible’ . … The pressure was not only from investors 
but also from other actors, such as the media, who asked if there were 
any documents to look at. That was when I thought that we needed to 
document this. … I received so many calls and had to spend so much 
time talking about this. And in the end I always got the comment, ‘But 
it is not documented! I don’ t trust it, because it is only something that 
you are saying now’ . That was when I decided that the external 
demands were increasing to such an extent that we had to document 
what we stood for. It was not enough to say it. 
At this time, the corporate manager responsible for the code of conduct process had 
no plan to turn the code of conduct into an IFA. 
I did not even consider turning the code of conduct into an agreement. 
My only idea was to publish a code of conduct that was consistent 
with what one would expect such a code to include. 
In sharp contrast, the enterprise-level union representatives perceived the process of 
developing a code of conduct as the next step toward reaching an IFA, and were 
convinced that the workers’  rights part of the code of conduct would eventually 
become an agreement.  
They [i.e., EuroCorp] said that when the code of conduct had been 
developed, they would sign [an IFA]. They said, ‘Yes, we will sign – 
we promise to sign – but we have to do this first. When the code is 
adopted, we will continue with our process and sign [an IFA]’ .  
The code of conduct working group consisted of two EuroCorp representatives, one 
external consultant, and a national-level union representative. Hence, the union 
movement was represented in the process, but not in the form of either the enterprise-
level union or the global union federation. This might be somewhat surprising, given 
that it was these two actors that had instigated and driven the IFA question at 
EuroCorp to that point. One of the EuroCorp managers explained why they had 
chosen a national rather than enterprise-level union representative: 
Our idea was probably not to get into negotiations. If it had been the 
enterprise-level union representative, it would have turned into 
negotiations. He would have taken the EuroCorp union position, so in 
retrospect it feels like it was the right choice. The chosen national-
level union representative was also the person responsible for 
EuroCorp in the national union. 
The enterprise-level union representatives saw no problems with having this 
particular national union representative participate in the code of conduct process to 
represent the union movement’ s agenda. As one enterprise-level union representative 
explained, 
He [i.e., the national-level union representative] was our union expert. 
He had an impeccable reputation, was extremely knowledgeable, and 
had an outstanding network. From my perspective, he might as well 
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have been at EuroCorp. We were supportive of having him in the 
working group. It was our relationship with him that made all the 
difference, so from our perspective there was no big difference if it 
was he or I who was involved in the process …  We talked weekly 
about all sorts of issues, met at least monthly, and travelled around the 
world together three–four times a year.  
Relatively soon after its establishment, the working group had developed a unilateral 
code of conduct. The code was largely inspired by other companies’  codes of conduct 
and by international guidelines, such as the UN declarations, the OECD principles for 
multinational corporations, the ILO conventions, and the UN Global Compact. As one 
manager recalled, 
We discussed: How do you write? What have other companies done? 
We stole and borrowed sections and sentences from others. Copy and 
paste you might call it. Really, we were copying and pasting from the 
UN and the OECD, and that was not difficult. However, we did not 
simply copy passages without understanding what they meant. So we 
had to go into detail in all issues, to understand the meaning of what 
we were copying. We also added things that were appropriate from our 
perspective …  In addition to other companies’  codes of conduct, the 
OECD was important, and after that it was the ILO conventions, the 
Global Compact, and the UN human rights agreements. 
Moving from a code of conduct to an international framework agreement 
When the code of conduct process was completed with the adoption of the code, 
discussions of an IFA came to the fore again. The IFA discussions, which had been 
ongoing parallel with the code of conduct work, now regained momentum. 
Specifically, the discussions now concerned converting the section on responsibilities 
for employees into an agreement. As one EuroCorp manager explained, 
The enterprise-level union kept asking if we could move forward and 
sign an agreement now that we had the code. I resisted because I knew 
that I would never get top management approval for this. One of the 
comments I got from top management was: Well, we can do this, but 
what will we get out of it? I responded that the question was probably 
not what we would get; it was more a question of retaining what we 
had. We had very good relations [with the enterprise-level union], so 
we really had nothing to be afraid of. But they [i.e., top management] 
thought that this was naïve, and said that we would not sign. It simply 
remained for me to inform the union that there would be no agreement. 
Then we changed top management and the enterprise-level union came 
back and asked again. I raised the question with top management 
again, and said that to get some peace and quiet we should probably 
sign an agreement based on the code of conduct. This time my position 
was supported, and we eventually signed the agreement. It is a 
document that helped them [i.e., the enterprise-level union] to achieve 
an agreement that was so important to them, and since the agreement 
was based on our code of conduct it meant no additional 
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responsibilities for us and did not change our practices, for better or 
worse.  
As another manager further explained, 
After we had the code, the enterprise-level union wanted an agreement. 
The code was a unilateral statement really. Although union 
representatives had been involved in the process, it was our, and not 
the enterprise-level union’ s, position. That was why they wanted it 
signed. I think it is a bit strange, because if we say that we have 
adopted this policy and put our company name on it, we will live by it 
– no doubt about that. 
Hence, the EuroCorp managers perceived that an IFA – in addition to the already 
adopted code of conduct – had limited value to the company in terms of either 
external symbolic importance or changes in corporate processes. This point was 
further supported with reference to the lack of internal and external communication 
when the IFA was signed: 
Well, we made an agreement with our union; it is not something that 
we wrote press releases about. 
Before reaching the actual agreement, several difficulties had to be overcome. First, 
there was debate regarding who in the union movement should sign the IFA, with the 
GUF wanting to sign. EuroCorp management, however, resisted this, insisting on the 
agreement being signed by the enterprise-level union.  
The question was who should sign the agreement, whether it should be 
we [i.e., the GUF], the European union federation, or the enterprise-
level union. But it was completely clear, to have an agreement that was 
legitimate worldwide, the only option was for us [i.e., the GUF] to sign 
such an agreement. This was the appropriate solution according to us. 
We [i.e., EuroCorp management] did not want to sign an agreement 
with a global union. It was not that type of agreement. I mean 
regardless, it was never a possibility. But I know that they raised this 
matter. It was what they wanted. To this I responded, ‘Never’ . Our 
agreements are for our employees, and this [the IFA] specifies a way to 
act towards our employees. This was not a cunning strategy to avoid 
any legal responsibility, but rather an emotional decision. Why should 
we make an agreement with a GUF? Implicitly, the GUF does not 
really have anything to do with what we do. 
The enterprise-level union occupied a middle position in this debate; as their 
representatives recalled, 
We faced a dilemma as enterprise-level union representatives. We 
really wanted this agreement and EuroCorp refused to enter into an 
agreement signed by the GUF. 
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The GUF claimed to have the right to sign the agreement, because 
without their signature the document would not be worth anything. We 
had to try to explain to them that if we did not find a solution there 
would no agreement at all, and this was not our aim and could not be 
the GUF’ s aim either. The alternative was to have no agreement at all. 
It was that bad. We would then have had to move forward ourselves 
without the GUF. 
The eventual way out of the impasse was for the enterprise-level union to sign the 
agreement as a representative of both the EuroCorp workers and the GUF. This was 
more in line with the position of EuroCorp and the enterprise-level union than with the 
GUF’ s original position. 
Additional difficulties included the level of detail in the IFA content, the issue of 
supplier responsibilities, and control structures for the agreements. Regarding the level 
of detail, one EuroCorp manager explained and an enterprise union representative later 
elaborated, as follows:  
Short is good …  It was a conscious strategy to keep the text short and 
general rather than very detailed. 
Representatives of the GUF argued that all the details should be 
regulated in the agreement. Everything that is not regulated is a 
restriction, while we saw it the other way. The agreement should 
include as little detail as possible, to give us as much freedom as 
possible. Their ideas were based on the notion that you [i.e., the 
company and the union] cannot trust each other so everything should 
be regulated. Our ideas were based on the notion that you should trust 
each other. If there are some problems, you have to sit down in a 
working group and solve them. 
Regarding supplier responsibilities, EuroCorp managers were not prepared to include 
strict paragraphs regarding the applicability of the agreement to suppliers’  operations. 
Again, this was in conflict with the GUF position, placing the enterprise-level union in 
the middle. As one enterprise-level union representative explained, 
I fully understand their [i.e., EuroCorp’ s] position. To exert control 
over the largest suppliers is reasonable, because they buy so much and 
should then make demands. And they [EuroCorp] were not against 
that. But this was not the demand of the GUF: [they wanted] every 
supplier and sub-supplier should be included, and it should be possible 
for the GUF to monitor the working conditions at these suppliers. Of 
course, EuroCorp claimed: we are doing a good thing here, trying to 
sign and abide by these rules, and then someone would be able to enter 
through the back door, throwing more dirt at us than at any other 
company because we are in the front line. We will be one of the first 
companies with such an agreement. So there was fear from the 
corporate counterpart. We [i.e., the enterprise-level union] were telling 
the GUF to tone down these supplier demands, because it is not going 
to happen. It was one of the biggest issues in the negotiations. 
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Finally, there was also conflict regarding the extent to which GUF representatives 
would be involved in the IFA implementation structures. As one EuroCorp manager 
recalled,  
The GUF representatives involved in the discussions were of the 
opinion that there should be a working group with union 
representatives [i.e., including GUF representatives] that should 
monitor compliance globally. We [i.e., EuroCorp] basically said that 
this was never going to happen. Anyone from the enterprise-level 
union knows that they are allowed to go anywhere they want: 
EuroCorp has opened and will open all possible doors for them. They 
can look at whatever they want, whenever, but we are not going to 
create some sort of task force that attempts to expose non-
compliances. This is not the way we want to run EuroCorp. The GUF 
representatives still felt that it had to be an external working group – 
this was the only way to provide trustworthy monitoring. And then we 
simply had to explain that if this was their absolute demand, we would 
not reach an agreement. Then we would not even have to discuss IFAs 
any more, since it is we who decide how to run EuroCorp. We have 
nothing to hide, but we are not going to change our corporate culture 
into a culture of ambushing. 
In all these conflicts, the outcome was almost completely in line with the EuroCorp 
management and EuroCorp enterprise-level union position. Hence, the GUF had 
limited success in influencing the content and implementation of the IFA. 
Interestingly, the conflicts were mainly between the EuroCorp management and 
enterprise-level union on the one side and the GUF on the other, i.e., EuroCorp 
management and the enterprise-level union often had similar positions.  
The lack of expected motives for IFA adoption 
Prior research has identified four main plausible reasons why corporations adopt 
IFAs: i) to retain, restore, and/or improve legitimacy, ii) to avoid governmental 
interference, iii) for ethical reasons, and iv) to achieve competitive advantages. Of 
these explanations, the legitimacy explanation is the one best supported in previous 
research.  
However, legitimacy does not seem to account for why EuroCorp adopted an IFA. 
First, EuroCorp was not the target of any activist campaigns or media ‘scandals’ . In 
fact, during the IFA adoption process (1996–2003), there was little, if any, external 
pressure on EuroCorp to adopt an IFA. The only external pressure EuroCorp 
experienced during the process was media and investor pressure in the late 1990s to 
develop a code of conduct. Hence, EuroCorp’ s adoption of an IFA can hardly be seen 
as a reactive response to activist pressure, which is identified as a key reason for 
corporate adoption of IFAs (Miller, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005) and codes of conduct (e.g., 
van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Graafland, 2004; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006).  
Although it was not a reactive response, the IFA adoption could be a proactive 
strategy for improving legitimacy (cf. Sethi and Sama, 1998). By signing an IFA, 
EuroCorp could benefit from being publicly perceived as a responsible corporation. 
To date, however, EuroCorp has rarely communicated either internally or externally 
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that it has signed an IFA. This is not related to EuroCorp being passive in 
communicating its CSR activities. On the contrary, EuroCorp, for example, has a 
section on its website devoted to CSR, publishes an annual CSR report, and conducts 
extensive internal worldwide training in CSR. In all these activities, EuroCorp 
emphasises its various CSR efforts in the form of, for example, participation in the 
UN Global Compact and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, its 
community involvement projects, and its rankings in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
and FTSE4Good indexes. Interestingly, EuroCorp also frequently refers to its code of 
conduct in both internal and external communications. However, rarely, if ever, is it 
mentioned that the workers’  rights part of the code of conduct is an IFA. Hence, it is 
implausible that EuroCorp adopted an IFA as a proactive strategy for improving 
legitimacy – at least if we assume that EuroCorp is not incompetent in communicating 
its CSR initiatives (existing data actually point to EuroCorp being skilled in such 
communication).  
It is here important to distinguish EuroCorp’ s motives for adopting the code of 
conduct from its motives for adopting the IFA. It is possible, even plausible, that 
EuroCorp adopted its code of conduct at least partly to improve its legitimacy. As 
some of the involved actors in the process noted, codes of conduct were becoming 
standard among international TNCs and there was mounting external pressure for 
EuroCorp to develop such a code. Hence, EuroCorp’ s adoption of a code of conduct 
can be understood as an isomorphic response to external pressures to gain legitimacy 
(e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Long and Driscoll, 
2008). However, isomorphic responses do not explain why EuroCorp took the extra 
step and also signed an IFA, since few companies at that time had signed them. 
If a desire to retain, restore, or improve legitimacy cannot explain EuroCorp’ s 
adoption of an IFA, perhaps the second explanation, i.e., avoidance of government 
interference, can. Although none of the involved actors explicitly referred to potential 
future government involvement in regulating workers’  rights, it is of course possible 
that this was an implicit reason for EuroCorp’ s adoption of an IFA. However, while 
the argument that adopting codes of conduct could serve as a strategy to crowd out 
governmental regulation is partly reasonable (cf. Bartly, 2005), the argument that the 
extra step of also adopting IFAs will have any such effect is implausible. Unions’  
roles and influence in industrial relations systems have been challenged over the past 
decade by declining membership in Western countries (e.g., Wills, 1998, 2002) and 
low or virtually non-existent membership in developing countries (e.g., Chan and 
Ross, 2003; Valor, 2005). In addition, unions’  legal and political influence has 
decreased in the face of the neo-liberal political agenda that dominates Western 
politics (e.g., Wills, 1998; Connor, 2004; Eade, 2004). This declining influence has 
been explained by claims that the collectivist ideology of unions has become outdated 
as work has become individualised (Allvin and Sverke, 2000), roles and identities 
have been reframed as individual service production (Phelps Brown, 1990; Bassett 
and Cave, 1993), and individuals have come to be more influenced by their role as 
consumers rather than as producers (Giddens, 1991; Lyon, 1999). Hence, unions are 
struggling to retain their legal and political influence, making it unreasonable to 
assume that without the voluntary corporate signing of IFAs a sharpened legal 
framework for union rights would emerge. Consequently, while avoidance of 
government involvement might indirectly accounted for EuroCorp’ s adoption of a 
code of conduct, it is implausible that it was a reason for adopting the IFA. 
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The third explanation – ethical reasons – is somewhat difficult to evaluate. The 
involved actors seemed genuinely concerned about the conditions in EuroCorp’ s and 
its suppliers’  operations. The interviewed corporate representatives, however, did not 
seem to regard this as the key motive for adopting an IFA – although the existence of 
moral reasons certainly did not damage the process. The EuroCorp managers 
perceived that EuroCorp was already operating in a responsible way and that an IFA 
would imply few, if any, actual changes as compared with solely having a unilateral 
code of conduct. Finally, the fourth explanation – to achieve competitive advantages – 
is somewhat vague and will be returned to after a discussion of the actual plausible 
reason for EuroCorp’ s signing of an IFA. 
An alternative conceptualisation of stakeholder pressure 
Retaining trusting corporate–union relations as a motive for adopting IFAs 
The above discussion has indicated that an adequate explanation of why EuroCorp 
adopted an IFA is not to be found among the main reasons presented in previous 
research. The findings of this study indicate that this is due to the same reason that 
there is only sparse research into IFAs, i.e., the neglect of the union perspective in the 
business ethics literature.  
The union movement – in the form of a global union federation – was the instigator of 
the code of conduct and IFA processes. The union movement – in the form of the 
enterprise-level union – also between 1996 and 2003 consistently pressured 
EuroCorp’ s top management to adopt an IFA, and the union movement – in the form 
of the national-level union – was part of the working group that developed the code of 
conduct. Hence, the union movement was a central actor in many different aspects of 
the IFA process. As evident in this case, EuroCorp managers also argue that pressure 
from the enterprise-level union was the key instigator of the process and that the 
motive for adopting an IFA was to retain a positive corporate–union relationship. As 
one manager framed it, 
The enterprise-level union kept asking if we could move forward and 
sign an agreement now that we had the code …  For some reason I felt 
that maybe we should have an agreement, because they [the EuroCorp 
enterprise-level union] would not let this idea go …  I raised the 
question with top management again and said that to get some peace 
and quiet we should probably sign an agreement based on the code of 
conduct.  
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the main, and perhaps only, reason why 
EuroCorp took the additional step of adopting an IFA was that the enterprise-level 
union continuously pressured it to do so and that EuroCorp wanted to retain the 
perceived positive corporate–union relationship. This empirical finding illustrates the 
importance of including an analysis of the role of unions in studies of CSR in general 
and of codes of conduct and IFAs in particular (cf. Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001; 
Riisgaard, 2005; Provis, 2006; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007). It also illustrates 
that our understanding of corporate motives for adopting IFAs must be broadened – as 
compared with the four previously identified motives for adopting codes of conduct – 
also to include the motive of preserving and/or improving corporate relations with the 
union movement (especially the enterprise level in the union movement).  
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A continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure 
The case findings illustrate the importance of including an analysis of the union 
movement in CSR studies in general and in studies of corporate motives for adopting 
IFAs in particular; as well, it points to an important conceptual limitation of previous 
code of conduct, IFA, and more general CSR research, regarding how to 
conceptualise stakeholder pressure. From a general perspective, the EuroCorp case 
findings could be interpreted as supporting the argument that companies adopt IFAs 
in reaction to stakeholder pressure to restore, retain, or improve legitimacy, which 
would support the main argument made in previous research into corporate motives 
for adopting codes of conduct and IFAs (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Graafland, 
2004; Miller, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006). However, 
when these previous studies discuss stakeholder pressure and legitimacy, they mainly 
refer to pressure in the form of consumer campaigns, media tactics and ‘scandals’ , and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. This is also why the notion of corporate brand is 
so closely linked to reasoning as to why companies adopt codes of conduct, IFAs, and 
CSR policies (e.g., Sethi and Sama, 1998; Diller, 1999; van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; 
O’ Rourke, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Graafland, 2004; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006; 
Bartley, 2007; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2008). 
The EuroCorp case illustrates a very different dynamic. While the corporate adoption 
of an IFA was driven by stakeholder pressure, this pressure did not take the form of 
discrete campaigns and the expected corporate gain from signing an IFA was not an 
improved brand or improved legitimacy in the eyes of customers or the public. 
Instead, in the studied case, stakeholder pressure was embedded in a long-term 
continuous corporate–union relationship, and the purpose of signing the IFA was to 
retain this trusting relationship. Hence, the findings imply a different model of 
stakeholder pressure from that identified in previous research.  
Previous research has not identified the possibility of a complementary long-term 
embedded stakeholder pressure model, likely because most empirical processes for 
adopting codes of conduct and other CSR policies in response to stakeholder pressure 
have been instigated and driven by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) rather 
than labour unions (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; Graafland, 2004; 
Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006; Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2008). Hence, the 
empirical basis on which conceptual frameworks of stakeholder pressure have 
developed has been fairly homogenous (at least in this respect).  
Although NGOs and labour unions often share the same objective of improving 
workers’  rights (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Egels-Zandén and 
Hyllman, 2006), there are central differences between how they operate, leading to 
different stakeholder pressure strategies. NGOs usually have relatively unstable 
financial resource bases, with financial support from governments and other funders 
being determined on a yearly basis. This causes NGOs to concentrate on influencing 
corporations in highly visible discrete campaigns (cf. Braun and Gearhart, 2004). 
Furthermore, NGOs have not traditionally been involved in ongoing negotiations in 
industrial relations systems, making NGOs outsiders when it comes to workers’  rights 
issues (cf. Dunlop, 1958; Bamber and Lansbury, 1998). Hence, researchers studying 
processes led by NGOs find and conclude that codes of conduct, IFAs, and CSR 
policies are more generally motivated by stakeholder pressure in the form of discrete 
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(often highly visible) activist campaigns with the purpose of achieving improved 
legitimacy in the eyes of consumers and the public.  
In contrast, when stakeholder pressure primarily comes from the union movement – 
especially from influential parts of the union movement, as was the situation in the 
EuroCorp case – it has a different character. Unions, together with corporations and 
governments, are the key actors in industrial relations systems (Dunlop, 1958; Bamber 
and Lansbury, 1998), and are consequently involved in long-term continuous 
relationships with corporations. In addition, unions have relatively stable financial 
resource bases stemming from their memberships, and union officials are held 
accountable to their constituents over a longer time period. All this leads to union 
influence strategies being embedded in a well-established tradition of continuous 
bargaining regarding many local, national, and international issues, of which codes of 
conduct, IFAs, and CSR policies are often not even among the most important.  
These differences lead to two different conceptual models of stakeholder pressure. 
Table 1 illustrates the differences between: i) a model dominating previous research 
(e.g., as illustrated in the research into corporate motives for adopting codes and 
IFAs), which stresses that stakeholder pressure stems from discrete, highly visible 
activist campaigns evoking corporate responses aimed at restoring or improving 
corporate legitimacy in the eyes of customers, investors, and the public, and ii) a 
proposed model stressing that stakeholder pressure is embedded in long-term, 
continuous bargaining corporate–stakeholder relationships. 
Characteristics Traditional model of 
stakeholder pressure 
Complementary model 
of stakeholder pressure 
Issues Single issues Multiple issues 
Frequency Discrete campaigns Continuous bargaining 
Public visibility High Low 
Purpose Improved legitimacy Retained trusting relations 
Table 1: Differences between a traditional and a complementary conceptual model of 
stakeholder pressure. 
As seen in Table 1, there are four main differences between these conceptual models 
of stakeholder pressure. First, the traditional model frames stakeholder pressure in 
relation to single issues, such as the adoption of codes of conduct and responsibility 
for suppliers’  operations. In comparison, the proposed complementary model frames 
stakeholder pressure in relation to multiple issues; issues such as codes of conduct, 
IFAs, and supplier responsibility are but a few of the many issues covered in the firm–
stakeholder relationship – and not necessarily among the most important matters 
involved in the relationship. In the studied case, this difference is illustrated by the 
fact that investor and media pressure (in relation to workers’  rights issues) focused on 
making EuroCorp adopt a code of conduct, and even more specifically, primarily to 
develop a policy regarding child labour. In contrast, labour union movement pressure 
focused on codes of conduct, IFAs, and many other related workers’  rights issues 
(e.g., staffing, workers’  shifts, working hour regulations, and salaries). 
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Second, the traditional model conceptualises stakeholder pressure as discrete activist 
campaigns, while the proposed complementary model conceptualises such pressure as 
long-term continuous bargaining. In the studied case, this difference is illustrated by 
the discrete – sometimes cyclic – attention paid to workers’  rights issues by the media 
and investors. Although workers’  rights issues have been a ‘hot topic’  since the late 
1990s, it still only receives piecemeal attention, at least in relation to specific 
companies. In comparison, union movement pressure in relation to workers’  rights 
had been ongoing and systematic since the founding of EuroCorp. An institutionalised 
bargaining relationship had developed over the years, allowing the matter of an IFA to 
be consistently discussed from 1996 to 2003 and the implementation of the IFA to be 
linked to EuroCorp’ s global World Works Council founded in the 1970s. 
Third, in the traditional model of stakeholder pressure, public campaigns, media 
coverage, and ‘scandals’  are important, while in the proposed complementary 
bargaining model, conflicts are often kept out of the spotlight. As several of the 
interviewed union representatives noted in the studied case, 
Our [the corporate–union] relationship builds on [the assumption] that 
you nurture the relationship and do not discuss conflicts externally. 
We would never ‘trash talk’  the corporation externally or in the media. 
Internally, there could be extremely heated debates, but externally – 
never ever. We could be furious with them, but if the media called, we 
would say nothing of our conflicts. 
Fourth, as noted above, the traditional model of stakeholder pressure conceptualises 
the purpose of stakeholder pressure as threatening the legitimacy of the firm in the 
eyes of its customers and the public, while the complementary model emphasises the 
endeavour to retain a trusting relationship – in this case, a trusting corporate–union 
relationship – as the main purpose.  
Two quotations from the conducted study illustrate well how the four aspects of the 
complementary model of stakeholder pressure interlink in practice. The multiplicity of 
issues, continuous bargaining nature, and trusting relations are illustrated in a 
quotation from one EuroCorp manager, reflecting on the legal status of IFAs:  
I don’ t know if it is legally binding. Well, I don’ t think so. Maybe I am 
naïve if I ask ‘Does it matter?’  If EuroCorp formally codifies 
something, it should be followed. And I cannot imagine a situation in 
which we would say that we did not wish to follow such and such a 
document simply because it was not legally binding. I know that some 
managers were scared of exactly such questions, thinking that they 
[i.e., the enterprise-level union] would use them against us. However, 
if you have lived with EuroCorp you understand that the EuroCorp 
union is not sitting and waiting for an opportunity to drive a dagger 
into your back because you agreed to something. It is not that kind of 
relationship that we have, and we need to be careful that we do not 
create such a relationship either. You have to put aside your suspicions 
regarding what they [i.e., the union] mean and why they are doing this 
…  Since the 1980s – well really long before then – there has been very 
productive collaboration between the management of EuroCorp and 
the enterprise union. I think that many can testify that this is the case. 
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Interviews with union representatives provide a similar illustration of the 
complementary model of stakeholder pressure:  
I think that it is relatively unique, even internationally, to have the type 
of relationship that we have [with corporate management]. This 
relationship has been nurtured over the years – it is not something that 
emerges from one year to another. Historically, we have had an 
understanding of one another’ s differences and have respected one 
another. The goal has always been the same, but we have been very 
aware of one another’ s roles. 
In a continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure, even the boundaries 
between the firm and the stakeholder are sometimes less clear than traditionally 
envisioned. This is especially so in relation to enterprise-level unions made up of the 
corporation’ s employees. As one manager put it, “ The enterprise level union is 
absolutely an integral part of us [i.e., EuroCorp].”   
These quotations depict the logic of a complementary continuous bargaining model of 
stakeholder pressure. In such firm–stakeholder relationships, the relationship itself can 
be seen by the firm as a valuable resource. Several EuroCorp managers claimed that 
the trusting corporate–union relationship was key to EuroCorp’ s ability to do business 
successfully, and the relationship was seen as a source of competitive advantage vis-à-
vis EuroCorp’ s competitors. Hence, EuroCorp’ s motive for adopting an IFA was to 
retain the trusting corporate–union relationship in order to retain one of its competitive 
advantages. This study’ s findings support the claim that CSR activities can provide 
competitive advantages, although this was achieved differently than is proposed in 
previous research (cf. Waddock et al., 2002; Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Bondy et 
al., 2004). 
In sum, stakeholder pressure can take many forms, and the study of why EuroCorp 
adopted an IFA indicates that we need to complement existing research with a 
continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure to capture this diversity more 
fully. As shown in the above discussion, the traditional discrete campaign model and 
the proposed continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure can co-exist in 
practice, as firms are pressured in different ways at different times. In the specific 
EuroCorp case, the traditional model of stakeholder pressure led to the adoption of a 
code of conduct, while the complementary model led to the adoption of an IFA. The 
important thing here is not this end result, which could certainly differ in other cases, 
but the recognition of another conceptualisation of stakeholder pressure that broadens 
our understanding of firm–stakeholder relationships. 
Conclusion 
This paper has started to fill the research gap regarding why corporations adopt 
international framework agreements (IFAs), based on a qualitative study of the 
process leading to a recent such agreement. The study’ s findings challenge existing 
findings as to why corporations adopt IFAs, codes of conduct, and/or CSR 
policies/practices, by indicating that corporate motives can be linked to retaining a 
trusting relationship with the labour union movement (especially at the enterprise 
level). Hence, our understanding of corporate motives for adopting IFAs must be 
broadened – as compared with the four previously identified motives for the adoption 
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of codes of conduct – also to include the motive of preserving and/or improving 
relations with the union movement. 
This paper’ s findings also indicate that how enterprise-level unions (and the union 
movement more generally) influence corporate decision-making differs from how 
stakeholder pressure has been conceptualised in previous research. While previous 
research has been based on a discrete campaign model of stakeholder pressure, this 
paper demonstrates that such a model needs to be complemented by a continuous 
bargaining model of stakeholder pressure. These models differ in four important 
respects: i) issues included in stakeholder pressure (single versus multiple issues), ii) 
frequency of stakeholder pressure (discrete campaigns versus continuous bargaining), 
iii) public visibility of stakeholder pressure (high versus low), and iv) the purpose of 
corporate responses to stakeholder pressure (improved legitimacy in the eyes of 
customers and the public versus a retained, trusting firm–stakeholder relationship). 
This paper has several important implications for future research. First, it provides 
empirical and conceptual support for the claim that business ethics scholars need to 
pay increasing attention to labour union involvement in CSR issues. Second, it 
demonstrates the need for business ethics and industrial relations scholars to shift their 
focus from purely unilateral codes of conduct to negotiated international framework 
agreements. Third, it demonstrates that future research is needed to explain why 
motives for adopting IFAs differ between companies (for example, between EuroCorp 
and Chiquita), and why corporate motives differ between the adoption of IFAs and of 
codes of conduct. Fourth, while this paper starts to tease out why corporations adopt 
IFAs, future studies could analyse why corporations do not adopt IFAs (analysing, for 
example, failed IFA negotiation processes). Fifth, future research is also needed to 
determine whether the proposed continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure 
is unique to the workers’  rights realm and to corporate–union relationships, or 
whether it could be expanded into other realms and other firm–stakeholder 
relationships. Sixth, future research needs to address the question of stakeholder 
influence strategies more generally (cf. Frooman, 1999; de Bakker and den Hond, 
2008), and explain when and why stakeholders’  choose a continuous bargaining 
strategy as compared to a discrete campaign strategy. For example, are continuous 
bargaining strategies more likely in high-, as compared to low-, interdependence firm-
stakeholder relations (cf. Frooman, 1999), and are primary stakeholders more likely 
than secondary stakeholders to use this strategy (cf. de Bakker and den Hond, 2008)? 
Finally, more research is needed into corporate practices following the signing of an 
IFA, in other words, more research is needed into the intricate process of actually 
implementing IFAs. 
                                                 
1
 “ EuroCorp”  is an anonymised name that has no reference to either the studied TNC’ s name or any 
firm and/or organisation actually named “ EuroCorp” . 
2
 Interested readers can contact the author for access to transcripts of the conducted interviews. 
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